Discussion: reducing BLS keys

Governance Validator DAO
165

I’m assuming this has since passed. Is it recorded anywhere?

166

Yesterday I was doing some research on another layer 1 blockchain project, their idea to reduce centralization is to limit a validator total stake based on how many self-stake it has, for example if a validator self-stake 10,000 ONE then it can has 90,000 ONE max delegate to it, if it self-stake 1M ONE then it can has 9M ONE max delegate to it, etc. & I think it’s a good idea since it’s natural that those who self-stake more deserve more delegations.

167

Personally I feel self stake only makes your servers a bigger target for hackers and judging pools based off of self stake is an outdated practice that needs to go away.

Since validators can’t use a ledger we’re already at high risk if you keep a wallet on your validator nodes.

The minimum self stake needs to come down asap as well, 10k is also outdated.

5 Likes
168

Completely agree. I moved all my one except the min self stake to a ledger. Not risking my main bag in a software wallet. Staking with a hardware wallet is so much safer.

1 Like
169

Currently there is no way to stake using a smart contract wallet, with the way a staking transaction is signed and sent by an EOA. Am I correct on this?

170

Plenty of sites use smart contracts to stake.

You can’t use a multi-sig wallet at this point though, it has to be a standard wallet.

1 Like
171

I’m reading a lot of comments and what we have clear is:

We want a decentralized network for the good of the token.
We want many validators for the same reason.
We want the Validators to be elected
We want everyone receiving rewards.

So let it be simple.

  1. We change all unelected validators as elected and make them work and be part of the network right away.
  2. There will be a fee for entering the network or re-entering the network if you have your validator down for 48h. $500 or even $1000. This fee will be burned.
  3. Your APY return for delegators shown will be high as a L.Pool until you reach the minimum average top of X validators (let’s define that limit).
    While you are reaching the top, the APY should lowered, therefore, delegators will change to another. Let’s make really clear and shown this point so if delegators wants to make the most they’ll continue decentralizinh because of their benefits.
  4. The % returned of the stablish validators (the ones in the top) will be ruled same as today, based on the stability of the validator.

Cheers,

1 Like
172

Do you mean that everything but the self 10K is leaving to a hardware wallet? I understand that if you move it to a Ledger you could be delegating into another validators with the security of a hardware wallet, Right?

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I liked all of it, specially the part that makes all validators elected by standard. And the slashing is heavy, so…failure is not an option. :wink:

1 Like
174

Something like this really is the way to go (e.g., all eligible validators are automatically assigned keys)

  • It removes the headache that the Boostrap Initiative is surely going to be for the @HarmonyValidatorDAO
  • It addresses the shortfalls of the Bootstrap Initivative
  • It helps prevent multi-key validators from acquiring unnecessary keys, which directly prevents new/small validators from becoming elected, which directly inhibits decentralization

To respond to your points specifically:

  1. I don’t think this works. You would need to phase in the expansion of new validators. Last I checked there were aroudn 240 eligible validators and around 160 elected validators. If all 80 currently unelected but eligible were to become elected right now, it’s likely some of them would not be able to sign. And the possibility would exist that 2/3 consensus could not be reached if this were to happen, especially if a larger validator were to go down unexpectedly as well. To solve that problem, I think you’d have to only allow in a few at a time at set intervals (e.g., increase by 10 new validators every 10 epochs). It will take some time to fully implement, but that will be necessary to ensure the security and stability of the network

  2. I don’t think there should be a fee for entering the network. That’s what the 10,000 ONE staking is for, and all the server/start up costs, etc. But I’m not opposed to a re-entry fee if you became unelected for a poor sign rate. I’m just not sure it’s necessary. You could still keep in place the current method of a 1-epoch ineligibility. That would be “punishment” to the validator. If your goal is to “burn” more ONE for inflation reasons, then I think that should be looked at in a separate proposal altogether

  3. Why is this necessary? Could you not keep in place the current system in which validators x% below the EMS will automatically receive higher rewards until their total delegation grows?

  4. I’m not sure what you mean here

1 Like