So do we know a rough breakdown of staked ONE purchased pre/post hack? I would assume there is a percentage used to weigh risks and impacts for these types of proposals.
@Casey, after your Twitter threads the other day I’ve seen multiple validators say they voted YES because they were afraid if they voted NO then Harmony would pull their “validator initiative” support.
They viewed your “greedy” tweets as a public threat.
Can you state that Harmony will NOT pull its stake from validators for voting NO on HIP-30 (and any future HIP)?
I was speaking my opinion of the HIP in that tweet, and I admit, greedy maybe wasn’t the best word, but it was how I felt. From my point of view, if there were a chain I had a stake in, I would rather it cut its rewards in half than fail at being competitive.
I can’t speak on behalf of governance and delegation on behalf of Harmony since I try and remove myself from that aspect. I would assume they would vote according to those that align with their goal and initiatives.
Well, the correct answer is “No, validators won’t be penalized for how they vote.”
Otherwise Harmony would literally be buying votes in order to help pass governance that it wants passed.
And if validators will be penalized for how they vote, and only loyal pawns will receive staking support, then Harmony should clearly state that in its criteria to be eligible for the “Validator Fellowship” initiative. And it needs to be clearly stated prior to HIP-30v2 voting going live since it may directly affect how validators vote. @sophoah @theo1
I also don’t recall it being a requirement during the launch of the initiative last year. Perhaps @StrongMindsHold can shed some light here?
All the requirements for the initiative are in this form but it says in the beginning “please understand that this isn’t a permanent stake and subject to removal”
Interesting points. It is good you are raising them now.
Cutting the delegators’ staking rewards by more than half, yet doubling the Validators’ minimum commissions from 5% to 10% means the validators earn the same amount of ONE. That’s also how they bribe and “buy” validators to vote for this. IMO, governance here seems as corrupt as any centralized governing body.
@clp3777 The minimum commission is about keeping validator operations stable since we’re unable to simply cut costs in half and validators are needed to keep the chain running (and decentralized). Many validators voted No so that delegators could get a better compromise like 25% reduction instead of 50%.
Glad somebody has that old stuff handy.
I do understand that the requirements can change and Harmony has already adjusted/removed support from validators who no longer meet the criteria.
I just don’t see how Harmony can require that all “initiative” validators must vote how Harmony dictates in order to remain eligible. I know Casey was just making an off the cuff opinion and it wasn’t an official statement by Harmony. But since this has come up, it’s best we quash it now and make it extremely clear that that will not be part of the requirements for the Validator Fellowship initiative.
It would be interesting if each validator had to pick their commission rate from 0-10%, giving some added competitiveness.
50% was a compromise, but 90% is still Harmony’s goal.
We have that now for new validators up to 100 epochs. After 100 epochs, the minimum commission is 5%. This rule was voted on by the community after the network had no minimum commission and validators were running at a loss. 0% commission is bad for the network and makes it a race to the bottom.
Perhaps this is the greatest desire of team harmony today, but it is a misguided reasoning.
The reputation and reliability of the network has already BEEN COMPROMISED. The fact is historic.
Try to convince all the people who left Harmony after the constant administrative failures that brought us to this point, and tell them that the SAME TEAM that brought us here is now selling us the promise of a better future, but proposing something which is far from meeting the aspirations of the community.
There was a lack of courage to propose recovery in the past and there is no courage in the current proposal. They are just diluting the result of management errors in the proposal and selling the dream that: “if you don’t pass the network, you can’t handle it”
Well, is the network really that fragile?
If a proposal for dilution of team harmony is voted on and passes, would you abide by the community’s decision?
Were any cuts made in the flesh for those responsible for the weak security that resulted in the loss of horizon assets?
What was the counterpart of those responsible?
Why did this exodus occur in harmony?
All gone, nothing left, so what are we proposing to rebuild? the nothing?
Why didn’t you leave deppeg’s 1assets free to be repurchased on the market, decentralizing the decision of how to propose advantages for this in the hands of developers and projects?
just a few questions that, at least I, can’t find answers.
If there isn’t any DAO until a year later and with your “significant”, “fueling growth initiatives” and “up to the DAO” how any of us can be sure if the funds is going to where is suppose to go in the first year with the well know “management” when there isn’t any DAO ?
“fueling growth initiatives” - This so much made me remind the many DAOs and “pet projects” from the management that also was “growth initiatives” that everyone saw was bulshit and were done anyway and the result was what it was
Do Harmony want to be trusted? Create the DAO first, the recovery address and only then create a new HIP with:
1.The proper recovery value
2. Emission DAO with its members and recovery address to be signed by DAO and Harmony. The DAO members to be voted by the community to avoid favoritism
Also i’m sill waiting for the answer if harmony with this HIP will stop the current recovery payout (and leave all to be paid by delegators/validators) or if harmony will continue to pay
What type of compromise is it if you’re saying Harmony doesn’t want to honor it and it’s goal is still to go for 90%?
And I really don’t think you can call 50% a compromise from 90%, when 90% was a totally ridiculous starting point in the first place. It’s just bad faith negotiating by Harmony: Throw out an absurd figure like 90% - have it unanimously hated by the community - and then call 50% a compromise to make the community feel like they “won” something. Then shamelessly call the community greedy.
I’m looking forward to seeing the first real attempt at a compromise tomorrow (HIP-30v2).
Just had our vote cast. We had some debate and as I could gather, at least among the brazilian community, most of the comments were that Harmony was their top favorite chain, and with ALL that happened, with the hack, with the DAOs, AND with the exodus of dapps and network activity, they still SEE Harmony chain as an oportunity to hit a jackpot, but as speculation. The fear of leading in nothing but a dead chain, keep them from investing more. So the staking is the only thing making the chain alive RN, and while they fully support the recovery process, the fear of having it leading to a wrong path or being mismanaged still hover around as we saw sometimes over and over. Maybe a 25% as was discussed by some here, along with a timeframe to evaluate the results and make a NEW vote to keep it going or, if it fails, the rewards go back to where and how it was previously (as now), then maybe it would be saw as an act of good faith by them. Since by having this timeframe of 6 months or 1 year to work, the only reasonable choice would be to MAKE it work and show it´s results OR, think of something else.
The results were displayed at our twitter
After much consideration for both sides and weighing the benefits of this HIP as it stands vs the reasons why one would vote no, I have chosen to put in a NO vote for the current iteration of HIP-30.
I see the potential benefits of HIP-30 and though not all, many community members agree with HIP-30 and are ready to make a change that will better the future of this chain, and so am I. I also see that there are many concerns and questions that have yet to be addressed. There are also some other ideas that have not properly been considered before this vote.
There are many questions and unknowns including but not limited to:
Have you run any simulations on these scenarios to determine the outcome of the validators and the network?
Have you considered a protocol level fix for validators taking extra unnecessary keys from other active validators which causes the smallest validators to become unelected as well as unfairly boosts the apy of the validator who takes the keys? This could have a huge negative impact post HIP-30 if we simply rely on validators to do the right thing as it has not worked in the past and is not working currently.
Have you run any simulations or tests to determine the possible negative outcomes of cutting to 2 shards and then splitting to an uneven number of keys per shard and how the rewards will be properly distributed to the validators?
How do you determine what validators deserve foundation stake and how much they receive for how long?
Will there be enough foundation stake available for every active validator in need, or if there will not, have you made it clear that there could possibly be rotations and validators will lose election until the next round(s) of foundation delegation?
Who will be the multisig signers for the emissions DAO and how will they be voted into place?
How will the DAO be structured and who will write the SOP?
Who has control of the multisig and funds until this DAO is put into place?
Would 25% rewards split be enough, or even 55%, or will you still be looking to get 90% even if it’s not what the community and validators want?
I see the benefits in both with 25% reduction at around 6-7% apy vs going with a 55% cut and a 3-4% apy. Where on the other hand at 55% we cut the recovery time in more than half in theory, as long as it doesn’t negatively affect the price of $ONE or cause a decrease in rise during future market price increases. This is something we need to take into consideration if we go down to 3-4% staking rewards or possibly lower. A 90% cut is just crazy in my opinion to even consider.
With all of that said we also need to consider that the designated funds will not be fully available right away and will accumulate over time, so the recovery will take time either way. We should probably take our time and get this right. So far this vote has been split pretty even between yes/no and I would like to see the next version of this HIP get a lot more support on the yes side by making the necessary changes and answering any questions or concerns we have.
I would like to explain my reasons for voting NO. However, I want to emphasize that I strongly AGREE with the ideas presented in this HIP, which has made this an incredibly hard decision to make. Unfortunately, there are a few aspects that I have concerns about, and I believe we need to address them from the beginning.
As I have mentioned multiple times before, I have reservations about uneven slots and their impacts. It has been acknowledged that uneven slots are not ideal for developers, and there is no clear answer on how this would affect rewards. Therefore, I would fully support the idea of having even slots between shards.
I also have reservations about the proposed 55% reduction right from the start, as opposed to a ~25% reduction followed by incremental increases. My concern is to minimize the impact of a significant sell-off due to an unattractive APY so suddenly, given this is currently the main selling/holding point of Harmony in the eyes of delegators. While I am not against a rough 50% reduction, I believe it should be implemented gradually to minimize the impact.
Another point of concern is the control over the recovery funds during the first 12-18 months. Who will be controlling this? While I understand that a DAO will be established after the recovery is complete, I believe there needs to be a detailed understanding of how and by whom the emissions will be controlled during the initial period.
I eagerly look forward to collaborating with fellow validators, delegators, and Harmony to establish a V2 proposal that can effectively bring Harmony back on track in a sustainable manner.
Validators and delegators, we concluded the HIP-30 vote today with strong participations and clear feedback from our community. Going forward, we will be following up with incremental proposals with more discussion and broader consensus soon.
HIP-30 had 74.5% voting but failed to pass, with 46.8% YES instead of the necessary 66.7% super-majority. With over 196 posts on our governance forum and daily messages in our 220-member Telegram group with validators, everyone gave their best ideas.
In particular, we thank @ValidatorONE, @FortuneValidator, @AffinityShard in helping many discussions go in depth. @Legion, @easynode, @DKValidator were calling for the right way of engagement and growth. @PeaceLoveHarmony, @Jacksteroo, @Babylonode – and many others – all added thoughtful comments and questions.
In coming weeks we will be preparing better proposals with your feedback. Again, let’s drive forward together and make Harmony succeed.
— Harmony Team
looking forward to a new version of the boost of the network proposal
hope to see the essential takeaways from our discussion will be considered.
On my end, they are:
- do not abuse VDAO Charter (Governance section): the proposal has to be posted by and only by any of the elected validators;
- do not combine many things on one proposal: let’s vote on each consideration separately;
- split emission dao purposes into 2 different votes: let’s vote for the recovery first and after successful recovery of the “bad debt” we will vote for the funds for ecosystem development