where did you ask that? can’t find on the forum
Spoke with Theo outside of the forum in general dicussion and I asked this question. I believe its been stated publically somewhere already but I cant lay my hands on it right now. As per my last message above though I do highly recomend splitting these votes out once we hit governance as I have spoken to many who support some elements but not all of the current HIP.
@theo1 Could we get official clarification either way on whether this is to be one governence vote or multiple ? Thank you.
Hey, there isn’t any break down as of today, the full reward per block of 7 ONE is given to the validator and delegators.
7 ONE per block is given to… all delegators? Split based on total effective stake live?
I calculate around 28 per block atm, and with the proposed plan it would drop to about 12.5. Just would like clarification on how it’s split exactly so we can calculate some of the same projections with the new proposal.
yes
based on the effective stake at the end of the previous epoch
in your table, current would be 900 only because internal node are not earning any reward. reward is not exactly 441 000 000, it would mathematically calculate as follow : (days * hours * minutes * seconds * ONEPerBlock * shard0 / 2 = (365 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 7 * 4) / 2 = 441 504 000 ONE
and you can apply the 45/55 %
Hope that clarify things better.
Based on the feedback received here and from external conversations, the following proposal may increase the chances of success. Here’s the revised version:
- Implement a 25% reduction in emissions: This proposal aims to reduce emissions while minimizing the financial impact on delegators and validators. By implementing a moderate reduction, it is more likely to gain support and pass successfully. This reduction will help keep the rewards competitive with other chains and maintain attractive savings rates. Additionally, it will assist validators in covering their costs, especially those with lower stakes, and be more appealing to larger validators as well.
- Evaluate the results for 3-6 months: After implementing the 25% reduction, it is important to monitor and evaluate its impact over a period of 3-6 months. This enhanced recovery period will allow stakeholders to observe the benefits resulting from the emission reduction.
- Introduce a further proposal to increase reduction to 50%: Once the benefits of the initial 25% reduction become apparent and are widely acknowledged, it would be appropriate to propose another HIP to increase the emission reduction to 50%. This incremental approach gives stakeholders time to assess the impact of the initial reduction and increases the chances of the second proposal’s success.
In my opinion, this refined proposal has a greater chance of success in passing and aiding the recovery effort.
To increase the chances of success, I would still recommend to split the emissions reduction and shard/slot reduction into separate proposals. This approach allows users to evaluate and support each proposal independently, maximizing clarity and the likelihood of passing both proposals.
Participation amongst validators is currently quite low on this HIP which I dont think bodes well in passing it as a governance vote. I have spoken to a few validators who didnt know this HIP existed. Perhaps with my revised version above, it may help to still pass when validators only discover this at goverence vote level.
I would love to read others feedback on this.
Hi Soph,
Good to know that internal doesn’t earn rewards, that column is only used for the key/block reference so I’ve adjusted it below.
I’m not sure anything works based off keys as I believe it’s all based on effective stake weight at this point. Is that correct to assume?
that was a typo ofc that should be 60s and the final result what i had as expected. I’ll edit the previous post. Thanks for telling me
HIP-30 will remain as a collective network upgrade in one governance vote.
Aimed at achieving an efficient utilization of the shard and network capacity, while significantly accelerating recovery and laying the groundwork for community-led growth.
The shard, nodes, and emission change are all factors that impact the number of validators and delegators. We understand this may result in fewer number of validators initially after implementation, will continue delegating to validators through a Validator Fellows initiative to help active validators participate in the network. The aim is to optimize for active validators.
The clearing of depegged bridged assets will create an environment for new DeFi products and other products to grow again in our ecosystem. By allocating to developer tools, primitives, and products for user, a community-driven Emission DAO will shape the network’s future development, drastically enhancing the network’s utilization.
As for a roadmap @easynode, for the proposal moving forward and network participants can grow the network itself:
Year 1: The 242.825m ONEs will be allocated to recovery. During this year, we would develop the election and governance of Emission DAO. This will be a collaborative effort with the ecosystem from the start.
After Year 1: The Emission DAO would continue to allocate emissions to grow the ecosystem in the areas that are most needed at that time. This would include finishing recovery, supporting validators, incentivizing developers to build primitives such as multi-sig wallets, explorer improvements, testnet, LayerZero and other bridges, endpoint service, applications in DeFi, NFT, gaming, new user products, or burning.
The Emission DAO would have a process of regular re-elections and continually adapt the emission allocations and respond to the evolving needs of the Harmony network and broader market.
The creation of the Emission DAO would play a crucial role in a much larger ambition of having the ecosystem directly responsible for optimizing itself, run by the community, empowered by the funds from the protocol emissions.
While this is good information, this is just part of the “more details needed” section of this HIP and not a road map at all.
What’s the road map for harmony? What are the goals? What can we use to measure results and performace going forward?
More details can be found here:
We looked at the potential effects using assumptions from the current network state. It’s important to note that there are a multitude of variables and we expect the network to dynamically change so this is an analysis based on current state and various assumptions below:
Taking the total network stake and effective median stake from the last election, and applying it to a post HIP-30 landscape with the maximum key for a validator going from 52 (maximum of 13 on 4 shards) to 23 (13 on shard 0 and 10 on shard 1) we get the following calculation:
Current effective median stake * (52/23) = New effective median stake
35% Above = New Upper Bound
35% Below = New Lower Bound
Upper bound = 16,534,001
New effective median stake = 12,247,408
Lower bound = 7,960,815
Currently, 71 validators (https://staking.harmony.one) have a stake above this new estimated lower bound.
Rather than going based on keys, as many validators currently do not use the current max allotment of keys, we can also do the calculation as a total key change. This would be 900/405.
Current effective median stake * (900/405) = New effective median stake
Upper Bound = 16,251,369
New effective median stake = 12,038,051
Lower Bound = 7,824,733
This would increase from 71 to 72 validators in the current staking dashboard.
With the Validator Fellows initiative we will continue to bootstrap more active validators so that they can be elected and remain elected in the network as long as they stay actively engaged in participation. We are currently delegating various amounts to 71 validators (58 validators + 13 validators). We understand some of those validators from past delegations are no longer active. With the Validator Fellows initiative, we’ll be reviewing and re-delegating to support a subset of this group who remain active and activate new validators in the future who engage in governance, delegator onboarding, and ecosystem support.
This is a general and preliminary analysis and does not include dynamic changes in total network stake or potential transitions amongst validators which would change the effective median stake and the number of validators.
@theo1 this is what worries me and I’m pretty sure many others. MANY DON’T, but some do. And those ones could be able to wipe out many active validators that would be below the MS. In the recent past we had many newcomers that were pushed out due to key diving. We can’t rely on human behavior. If it is something that is not enforced at a protocol level, it won’t work. One will do, the 2nd will see that the first is doing and nothing is happening to him, no reprisal, no pushback, no call out, and will do as well, and so on. Soon your list of 71 validators could be reduced to 40, or 30, or 21. If the single key option is not enforced, it will be a mess. Take as example the recent past with the key diving practice.
“Those who cannot remember their past are condemned to repeat their mistakes”
We’re going to have another Twitter Space to discuss the hip 30 update.
When- Thursday 9:30am EST (1:30pm UTC)
Please set your reminder
https://twitter.com/i/spaces/1LyGBqawkvMKN
The key diving issue is something to be address by the protocol yes, and there were solution discussed previously to encourage the validator to use as less keys as possible. We should try to push forward those idea.
I won’t completely agree with that because the 71 here are validator that receives a foundation delegation, and for those elected they should be elected.
It won’t necessary fix the issue. I have seen in other chains that validators created by the same individual can exist multiple times. This could also happen here. For example, if I am Binance and I control all the delegated funds, I could easily delegate to 5 validators that I am managing.
You can witness what i am talking about here : Subscan | Aggregate Substrate ecological network high-precision Web3 explorer
I would advocate to work on encouraging big validator to use as less key as possible on the protocol level
Most of the big validators, doesn’t possess the necessary amount of self-stake to game the system. And if Binance or another CEX, do that, we all would be hostage from those institutions in ANY type of protocol system. What prevents them to do it already?
But the majority of the validators would need to make their delegators delegate again to each server that they spin up. Would be necessary a huge effort to make it. And if they do, congratulations to them. What else can be done? But its certain that if NOTHING is done to address any of those issues, we will se a ghost town, some validator scheme being gamed over and over by a bunch of validators.
I do not agree with the reduction of the staking rewards by 50% and the drastic reduction of validators. Reducing the staking rewards to noncompetitive rates will cause a large undelegation and sell-off that will depreciate the value of $ONE. Turning away small validators will break the last support force this chain has. This for the sake of 1-second goals? If the chain does not have utility, integrity, and/or value, what good is 1 second or 1/2 second. This is not a good move for the chain. Further discussion needs to occur with a broader view on what the priorities are for the chain.
I’m running a small elected validator that is decentralized, H1 Validator…Something needs to be done right now to incentivize building and growth on the chain. We have to put the past behind us and start fresh from here, and trust me. I started with Pangea testnet before the chain was launched so I know the history… I’m thinking about the bigger ,long-term ,5 years from now picture…We need to do something now. If that means a reduction then it’s a pain but a necessity… hopefully we come to consensus, compromise, maybe a 40 percent reduction if not 50. The balance needs to change…Personally, I don’t believe we’ll see a massive unstaking as a lot of people probably don’t remember having their tokens staked to begin with… I go to 10 crypto conferences around the world every year and few are currently talking about harmony and that needs to change with building and apps.
How the apps are going to stick to the chain if their allegations are that the staff is not trying to honor their promises?
Check that
We all know that the road can be hard and dangerous. We all know that, sacrifices must and will be made. But first AND foremost, the current issue that we have so far wasn’t caused by the delegators, wasn’t causes by validators, wasn’t caused by the dev builders. In order to save the chain, we all agree that everyone must compromise and stick with it to the end. But when we see something like that above, you start thinking if we’re really walking the right path? Many good projects started on harmony and just left to other chains that doesnt have the minimal, at least, as harmony has. The transaction speed, the vivid community enviroment, and etc. But they left, the hacking did that. And in order to bringing them back or others, we will really punish, the ones that are supporting us and keep the network alive? If it comes to that a clear plan must be created. Transparency is all. Start with baby steps and IF and only IF it proves that the results were close to the ones that was designed, them you can try to fast-forward and go full-ahead. We can only guess the effects that this hip may create. So, if it really happens, the best course of action would be doing it gradually, so the fine tuning can be properly done.
“Expect the best but be prepared for the worst”
I agree with this.
Why going straight to 50% reduction? That’s too brutal I think, and rewards won’t even compete with FIAT bank accounts APR.