I’d much prefer a DAO was organised for stONE with stONE as the governance token.
The addition/removal of validators, DAO signatories and decisions around fees could then be put to the stONE holders for snapshot voting.
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It is ultimately up to the Tranquil team how they would like to handle their business, that being the liquid staking product stONE. They came to R1 as a means to determine proper governance for their product, whether that be with snapshot votes open to all ONE holders or otherwise.
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Oh, I see more clearly now what you meant.
That can be something which we create a snapshot for, or potentially divide evenly across the validators.
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Yes, I understand the situation.
It’s nothing against R1… I held the same opinion when Tranquil proposed to hand it over to the VDAO: Tranquil Finance Stone Validator Proposal - #12 by DKValidator
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Your team has done great things as a recovery partner so I’m sure you would be a suitable candidate for validator allocation.
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R1 would be the sole governance team for all stONE validators? Or only a select subset of validators? Would there be other governance teams?
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How would voting happen? On what platform/site? With what token? Who’s eligible to vote? Etc.
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stONE has a 20% fee? It’s very possible I don’t understand/know enough about Tranquil’s protocol, but can someone explain to me why anyone would stake with Tranquil instead of traditional staking methods if there is a 20% fee associated with Tranquil stONE? And R1’s plan to generate revenue would be to receive part of that 20% fee as an “administration fee” billed to Tranquil, or what?
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Other metrics to consider when selecting validators:
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No validators with more than 2-3 BLS keys (to limit “stake centralization”).
Currently a 3-key validator could have up to ~24.8 million staked ONE (and remain within the .65-1.35 EMS bounds). This is equivalent to the 45th largest validator out of 144 elected validators. A 2-key validator would have 16.5 million staked ONE, which is equivalent to the 52nd largest validator. A maxed out 2-key or 3-key validator would both be larger than ~2/3 of all currently elected validators. -
Validators should have the least amount of BLS keys necessary to stay within the EMS bounds (to limit predatory and/or unnecessary key bidding by validators)
- e.g., if a validator having 3 keys puts them at .73, but having 2 keys puts them at 1.13, the validator should only bid on 2 keys (the minimum required to safely remain below 1.35 EMS) -
Reward rate shouldn’t be considered because it could encourage validators to bid below .65 EMS in order to get higher rewards (also to prevent predatory key bidding by validators). As long as all validators are within .65-1.35 EMS, and all have an adequate sign rate, they will all have a similar reward rate (depending on validator fee/commission %). Election rate would need to be considered for poor-performing validators and for smaller validators who ping-pong in and out of election.
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Just reiterating “active within the community”. For a “program” like this, and since it would presumably have (at least) the appearance of an endorsement from Tranquil/R1, I think delegators must be able to contact their validator and the validator must also be responsive
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I tend to agree with @DKValidator that Tranquil should have its own users vote on these things instead of offloading it elsewhere. Although, if R1 was the vector by which Tranquil users did this, than perhaps it would be appropriate (depending on how it was implemented).
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In regards to @HoundOne_Validator’s allocation question, Tranquil shouldn’t replicate stONE v1’s “target allocation”; It never made sense in the first place. I would think an equal distribution for v2 (minus the maximum allowed BLS key threshold - See #4 bullet point 1 above) would be the simplest method.
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R1 would take on the ultimate responsibility of the stONE allocation, and we would like to open the discussion and evaluation up to validators at the very least. My line of thought would be to allocate, perhaps in equal parts, to a set amount of validators from the new core-validator group (who qualify). It’s totally up for discussion, the point here is for Tranquil to turn the responsibility to R1 (at their request to us).
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This isn’t entirely fleshed out, but rather a concept that we are evaluating. With the new Harmony governance arrangements taking place amongst the preliminary core-validators group, I believe that we can adopt similar voting measures.
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We’d have to hear it from the Tranquil team, but that is what I was told from them. I could have somehow misunderstood. stONE is a liquid staking, autocompounding solution that also works in the money market. There have also been arbitrage opportunities between it and ONE, which it is usually pegged to.
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If we stake evenly then BLS keys won’t matter, right? Otherwise, I can see what you’re saying here.
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I agree and this was brought to R1 by the Tranquil team. They believe that we are an adequate body to handle Harmony community matters in the aftermath of… well, everything.
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Agreed.
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Thanks for the suggestions and feedback. We think R1’s involvement in $stONE’s allocation process can bring decentralization to the Harmony protocol, while also making $stONE a more valuable ecosystem resource.
If done right this can lead to increased community engagement and participation in the development and governance of the protocol, ultimately benefiting the Harmony ecosystem as a whole.
Would be interested to hear Harmony’s thoughts too.
Equal distribution of liquid staking, as opposed to the previous model, is a sound approach. It is crucial, however, that the chosen validators are active and diligent in monitoring nodes and staying informed through validator channels, utilizing tools such as vstats. The previous belief that larger validators were inherently safer and thus deserved a greater percentage of liquid stake has been challenged by recent developments, where it has become clear that size ( big or small ) does not always equate to activity. As such, a proposal for active validators seems to be a viable solution.
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No, that’s not right.
Granting a 250 million ONE validator an “equal” allocation as a 10 million ONE validator? Why? That doesn’t prevent stake centralization, which is a major issue for Harmony. R1 can’t talk about how taking over stONE governance is good for decentralization and then 
all over decentralization by including large validators via an inherently anti-decentralized staking allocation process. Can’t have it both ways.
Large validators shouldn’t be included. Period. And there should be a cutoff point to determine size and eligibility of validators. An easy method is BLS keys. Because then you can also implement standards to prevent stONE validators from abusing the system by grabbing extra keys in order to bid below bounds (below .65 EMS). Bidding below bounds is another issue with Harmony’s EPoS that is well documented here on the Talk forums.
And I suggested a 2-3 BLS key limit because that still leaves ~2/3 of all elected validators as eligible for stONE allocation (though obviously some will be ruled ineligible due to activity and performance qualifications).
I don’t recall how much ONE was stake with Tranquil/stONE in the end. I believe I recall a point in time where there was around 100 million ONE though. That ONE was unstaked by users from countless smaller validators and then redirected by Tranquil to only a select few validators, some of whom were quite large. It was widely criticized by validators but fell in deaf ears (a recurring theme). It was promoted as “decentralization” by Tranquil, but it was nothing more than a mass-centralization event (a mass-extinction event killed the dinosaurs).
I disagree, this is an opinion.
Some large validators become large because they are active and delegators wish to support them. They aren’t all some evil representation of centralization. stONE isn’t conceived to empower small validators or to promote centralization. It is a liquid staking solution and money market utility token. Large validators represent the stable, low-risk allocation of this investment in my opinion.
That said, if the Tranquil team have a different objective for a new version of stONE, your statement could become extraordinarily valid.
I agree with the notion of implementing stONE as a further measure to improve decentralization, but it must be said that it isn’t currently and objective. Your argument could change stONE if Tranquil team happened to hear it.
Fixed that for you, its not possible for new Validators to reach these sizes, even with maximum engagement.
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There are a -ton of small, active, reliable, responsive validators on Harmony. Most of whom have been validating for well over a year.
I suggested a 2-key or 3-key cap on how large stONE validators could be. That leaves approximately 2/3 of all elected Harmony validators as eligible for Tranquil stONE allocation (excluding other requirements).
2 to 3 keys can accommodate 16-24 million ONE. Those aren’t “small” validators. They’re just small compared to some of the large/massive validators stONE previously utilized
• There is no need for large validators to be part of stONE
• Don’t say “R1/stONE/Tranquil and ‘decentralization’” if the intent is to utilize large validators for stONE. It’s misleading. It will undoubtedly be marketed by both R1 and Tranquil as “decentralized”, and users will think they’re participating in something “good” or beneficial to the overall ecosystem. Just like the previous stONE marketing did, even though i already explained how it was a centralizing snafu.
• Why ask Tranquil what their wish for stONE is? I thought they were handing administration off to R1 to “decentralize” it? 
• Large validators and stake centralization are literally the opposite of decentralization. If you support one, you inherently oppose the other. You can call it “evil” if you want, but that’s the reality.
Okay, now that you’ve further defined ‘small’ we’re closer to agreeance. 2-3 keys sounds fair, but I still wonder about penalizing large validators by barring them entirely. Isn’t that in itself a variety of censorship and centralization? What about allocating stONE delegations more heavily to smaller, qualified validators, but still affording a lower percent to larger validators?
Is there truly no need to support large validators? I think that this is something to be discussed further.
I would confer with the Tranquil team on their product mostly because they are developing the smart contracts and those are where the constraints come from.
Large validators happen due to choice. If a validator becomes popular and delegators choose to stake with them, they become larger. Isn’t it each user’s right to choose where they stake? Isn’t the opportunity for the many to choose decentralized?
The problem is with the network. There is no cap to how large a validator can become, right?
I think it’s the same definition I used in my first post (i.e., 2-3 key limit, 16-24 million ONE cap).
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It would be voted on and approved via stONE governance.
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Why? Large validators aren’t necessary. There are certainly enough smaller validators to handle the stONE volume.
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“Support them”? I don’t know what you’re asking. Do they need stONE? No. They already have “support”. That’s why they’re large. The support is also often from large institutional delegators (e.g., Binance).
“Decentralize” and “support large validators”? Sounds like an oxymoron.
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I assume their contract allows them to insert the approved validators into it. Just have to create the validator list for them to use, no?
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In your initial post you listed several possible restrictions which would determine validator eligibility. Does that same argument not also apply to your own metrics?
If someone wants to stake with Binance, great - go do it (you weirdo). Nobody’s stopping them! But there’s no fundamental right that says Tranquil has to include Binance in their liquid staking protocol.
Hi!
¿dónde podemos ver la cantidad que ha sido quemada?
And because this chain doesnt give 2 fucks about decentralization
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I’ve been waiting for Tranquil to finish their buy and burn this round, but since they have started much later than expected I will release the Round 4 summary with their metrics left out until they become available, at which time I will update that article, which can be found on my Medium: http://bit.ly/3DxYleS
Li has also confirmed that the burn partners will be funded next week for Round 5, so as soon as any necessary updates are implemented we can proceed with a new funding round.
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Have u information to resolve for AAVE issue from Recovery One team ?
When team start buy or do something ?