You have a point there with the “Path of less resistance”. Some will create multiple wallets but hedge funds and Binance will probably just move their staking around and that is one of the main goals we would all like to see done.
This should be it’s own Proposal to be honest. I have seen this discussed before and I do like the idea. May I encourage you to create a new post about it?
This proposal has me intrigued. I’m eagerly awaiting the feasibility review from the Harmony devs.
Hi,
I think 5M should be the limit…
What would also be great is to allow staking rewards to be be automatically staked =compound.
Therefore, small delegators would not have to wait to reach 100 one to add to their staked Ones…
This proposal could really turn out to be one of the best things that could happen in the Harmony ecosystem.
Super excited to see where this can go, this is the kind of infrastructure we need to help level the governance landscape. We support this idea.
This is the way to go “dynamic APY” and all other proposals (this one included) is just a shortcut.
The decreasing APY with increasing ONEs staked is the way to do this organically, leaving to delegators the decision of moving their stake to a smaller validator if they want to keep a decent APY.
All hard caps (at validator and at delegator side) are making this too static and restrictive and too complex as well.
If we think about it, to cap the stake to let’s say 10mill (at normal APY) and then reduce the APY for the amount that exceeds that 10mill, is basically a dynamic APY.
I think the idea of increasing the minimum fee based on staked amount is also interesting as well and maybe someone can make a separate thread for it.
That would be the way to organically como to an equilibrium status, rebalancing the staked amount on each validator and softening the curve.
Directly decreasing the APY would probably more difficult to implement than the fee % increasing with the amount staked. So I am all for dynamic Fee.
Here it would be interesting to see how much more of the total Staked end up on validators and how much on delegators. Now most have or 5% or 0% with some exceptions, so as an example, let’s say that 4% of total stake ends up distributed to validators and 96% to delegators.
What would happen with a dynamic fee increase? The situation of total balance, with optimal distribution should keep reasonably where it is. The change shouldn’t favour (too much) the validator side if at all.
If this is implemented it would make Harmony much more decentralized and open doors for a much greater number of elected validators. We can’t just wait for people to decided to spread out their ONE, we really need something like this.
I see no reason why I shouldn’t be allowed to delegate all of my one to my favorite validator. And if they are already at or over limit, will I be locked out?
I think there are better options. Namely, a gradually reducing limit on the number of keys a validator can hold. I’ll be able to stake as much one with them as I’d like but with potentially diminishing returns that would encourage, not force, me to stake with other validators.
@tracer_120 Harmony One is a DeFi project and this right here is just a great proposal. Spreading the staking and having more validator will improve the DeFi and give a lot of value to the project: as of now many “experts” say one of the weakness of Harmony is being highly centralized.
The second part you said it’s also correct for a DeFi but I think the original proposal sounds better although the feasibility is quite complicated as you can’t force a retrospective act, yet we can set a new dateline.
There won’t be a global limit for how much you can stake to each validator (besides the existing limit that can be specified when the validator is created) so you can almost always delegate up to 5 to 20m ONE to your favorite validator. There aren’t many wallets with over 5m ONE so this rule is mainly meant to apply to institutions, exchanges and large whales.
A global key limit wouldn’t spread the stake as much unless the key limit was very small for all validators. The distribution of ONEs follows the power law where a handful of wallets in the top 100 control almost all the stake. If Binance alone spread their 1.5b stake to 5m a validator, we could add 300 validators to the ecosystem.
I’m not sure I’d be in favor of that. It’s possible the largest validators could actually see their earnings increase under that proposal if their large delegators don’t end up switching to different validators
We’re asking the Harmony team if we can apply this rule retroactively to existing stakes.
I have read the proposal and all the comments.
After careful review I have come to the conclusion that the only way this would likely work as intended by the majority would be if:
- It were retroactive to affect wallets already staked with a validator
- We will likely need a plan to encourage staking to smaller validators first.
5 Million ONE per wallet will affect around 115 wallets that currently stake their Harmony.
@TrickLuhDaKidz said, large validators could actually see their delegations increase. We would have to do some math to find out.
Lets use @RoboValidator as an example:
He currently has 316+ Million Total Staked on his validator. Four wallets on his validator would be affected by this change.
186 Mil, 14 Mil, 10 Mil, 10 Mil = 220 Million, lets say they keep 5 Million each on Robo’s validator.
He will potentially lose 200 Million delegation due to this proposal.
On the flip side, around 60-70 of those 115 wallets have enough ONE to delegate 5 Million to a second validator and still keep close to 5 Million on the first validator.
If 70 wallets split their Harmony times 5 Million per wallet that equals 350 Million that could go on just one wallet. This means that there is, no matter how unlikely, the possibility that if chosen by all 70 delegates, RoboValidator could end up netting positive gain of 150 Million.
If half of them chose him, 35 times 5 Mil. equals 175 Mil., which would only lower him down by 25 Million from the original 200 Million.
You might argue how likely is it that these people will choose a large validator when they split their stake? I thought about this for a while.
While it is unlikely they will all choose the same validator, it is actually extremely likely they will choose a large validator since they probably already stake with a large validator now, and may choose to do so again even if they have to split their stake.
With all of that said, I think that this proposal will still be somewhat effective, just not nearly as effective as many of you might think it would be unless we give people a reason to stake with smaller validators.
Here are more examples as it actually gets worse:
@ValidatorONE has 213 Million delegated.
84.9 Million from 7 wallets who then keep 5 Million each on his validator. He stands to lose 49.9 Million. He stands to gain a possible 350 Million as noted above for a total gain of 300.1 Million.
@FortuneValidator has 88 Million delegated.
10.2 Million from 1 wallet who would keep 5 Million on his validator. He stands to lose 5.2 Million. He stands to gain a possible 350 Million for a total gain of 344.8 Million.
Should I keep going? The numbers could get even worse…
I think you get the point on how unbalanced this plan is without proper implementation and could simply lead to a shift of delegation from exchange validators over to other large validators.
That’s remotely possible but theres one wallet with 1.5b alone. Based on the enormous size of that wallet they have to delegate to at least 300 unique validators alone.
Hi Riverbear,
Yes I agree, it is only remotely possible that all wallets will choose the same validator.
You are right, that 1.5bn wallet alone could get split to 300 validators. Most likely it will actually only get around 140 new validators elected since they will probably put the rest on already elected validators.
It is also only one of the 70 wallets that I was mentioning so you have to realize that there is still another 345 Million capable of being put on just one validator, even after the 1.5bn wallet has already staked with all 300 validators.
What we have to consider here is that the 1.5bn wallet is the ONLY wallet large enough to HAVE to choose any unelected validators. The rest of the wallets can just delegate to large validators and never get one single validator elected.
This is a truth we have to take into consideration, as unlikely as it may sound.
We could make it so wallets that are in violation of this if passed, get no rewards at all and their rewards go to a burn address or charity or DAO maybe? Pretty sure that would encourage them to comply lol
A wallet with 1.5 billion ONE could stake with 300+ unique validators, or spread their ONE amongst many wallets, to get around this restriction. how would we prevent someone from doing this? tbh someone could circumvent this entire idea. What’s to stop them from sending their ONE to many wallets that they own, and staking them all on the same validator as separate wallets? This restriction would be an easy one to get around if one wanted to. And keeping track of this could be done with a script, but then we are tracing transactions on our network to certain people and that I do not like at all.