Empirical data to demonstrate the clear flaw in the system and abuse their of. I would like to reiterate a “Round Robin” approach to validator selection particularly when using multiple BLS keys. If an individual or group take the time to setup and configure a validator, I think it prudent of the protocol to round robin through all eligible validators before assigning additional slots to validators that are using multiple keys.
LINK to my original Post: Proposal to Round Robin Slots to all eligible validators before filling up additional slots
The key to decentralization starts with how validators are selected. Fundamental in my mind to ensure a more robust and secure network. The voting side of this, if folks feel strongly about how a big validator is voting, and wants to allocate their votes to them. I’m all for the power of the people. I think decentralization starts with how validation is done, and security of the network should be the most important aspect of validator selection. Not how more efficient a validator business will profit off the rewards provided.
This is not just the responsibility of the validator, in my opinion, but also the delegator. How do we ensure security of the network and still provide the people with the voice they are given through their stake in the network? Should both of these reside in the same mechanism? I would argue, NOT, but that is not how Harmony ONE was established. Profits should not drive security of the network, validators, governors, and delegators all have a responsibility to ensure the security of the network by distributing the validation power until changes to the framework can be built to ensure a more reliable and secure network. Profits got us to this point, now we need to figure out a way to secure the network.