Bummer, that’s what made our system great.
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Great? That’s was a huge mess because it was never fixed so voting power has still moved the hole time! When a voting in November ended with 68% yes it was only 53% in February 
awesome “snapshot” that you can’t use today the data of previous votings 
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I’d be more concerned about getting every staking tx back on the blockchain right now than what the %'s are today vs the day an old vote ended 
It was great because if your validator voted irresponsibly you could pull your support before the final vote was tallied and make it count somewhere else. This is no longer an option but I suppose we crushed the voices of our delegators already by moving off chain.
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Oh thanks yeah I’m aware and told about this from start on and please also check my other topic about the snapshot but not a lot was contributing there 
About the results if the end results are not recorded or fixed how can you even have a democratic governance? And I can tell not a lot was aware of this bug. And with new snapshot there would be even snapshot voting power delegation possible what would probably be more transparent then this previous system.
But please go in here on talk to the correct topic and contribute their, HIP-27 is about quadratic voting and we should stay to this topic 
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Any news on this?
Already 2+ months without any working governance
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It was planned that the HIP-21 goes first to a voting but as I see the voting has been cancelled and removed 
We can bring this to a vote but I don’t see a big chance with the actual voter participation
I mean NO SINGLE ONE Validator of the too big to fail gave in here his feedback.
I don’t think that’s how it should be. And I don’t agree that that’s how Harmony actually operates, either.
#1. Simply put, there is nothing during the staking process to notify delegators that they have zero voting rights on HIPs. There is nothing during the staking process to notify delegators that their validator assumes all of their voting rights on HIPs. There is nothing during the staking process that informs delegators what the current HIPs are. There is nothing during the staking process that informs delegators how their validators have voted in the past that will allow them to see if they agree with their validator’s voting history.
#2. I would also argue that, if polled, the vast majority of delegators would be in favor of proposals that would increase decentralization and the number of total elected validators on Harmony. And yet, despite that, governance to increase the number of elected validators is routinely blocked. The status quo allows validators to override the will of the community. Allowing delegators to vote directly would prevent this issue.
#3. Currently there are ongoing HIP discussions to remove non-voting validators from counting towards quorum (the “Binance rule”). But even once Binance’s validator is removed from voting, they will still have ~1.5 billion ONE delegated to 26 non-Binance validators. How can anyone say “1 ONE = 1 vote” in regards to those 26 validators? If we acknowledge that Binance doesn’t vote and their validator’s ONE doesn’t count, then why are we still counting the ONE that Binance delegates? It is inconsistent logic.
Binance makes up well over 50% total stake for 22 of the 26 non-Binance validators they stake with. Some validators have as much as 99.65% of their total stake provided by Binance. Even the validator with the smallest Binance support still receives 29.7% of their total stake from Binance. It gives those 26 validators significantly more voting “power” than a validator with ZERO support from Binance. What do I mean by “power”?
Example (actual validator figures):
Validator Y has 90.15 million ONE staked, and 80 million ONE is provided by Binance. For Validator Y, 10.15 million ONE has the effective voting “power” of 90.15, an 8.88x multiplier.
Validator B has 183.22 million ONE staked, and 0 (ZERO) of it is provided by Binance. For Validator B, 183.22 million ONE has the effective voting “power” of 183.22 million ONE, i.e., no power multiplier at all!
Each “voting” ONE (non-Binance) that Validator Y has is effectively worth ~9x the value of each “voting” ONE from Validator B. That is ~9x the “power”.
Is this right? Is it fair? Is this what we mean by “1 ONE = 1 vote”? Are we being consistent in our methodology? Is this what’s best for Harmony?
I think the answer to all of those questions is NO.
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In regards to notifying delegates of HIP/Governance Proposals a snap in would be ideal to show a brief past voting history from that Validator. This would hopefully encourage the delegators to seek out information on these votes and educate themselves on network specifics. However, that is a whole separate HIP to be brought up.
I had to read the concept of ‘power’ you introduced here - and yes I agree. Binance, or any large exchange that will stake on a validator boosts their potential vote as opposed to those with no exchange stake. Removing non-voting nodes is not the cure all solution to ‘fix’ voting but it will help. Addressing large stake on non voting nodes in general is a different story - this is where HIP 21 (both parts) will help in determining the threshold for quorum. With the ‘muting’ of non voting nodes comes the issue of the large participating nodes being able to essentially agree on how to vote in alliance in aims of stopping a vote.
This is where quadratic voting comes in, aiming to more or less equalize voting ‘power’ amongst validators.
Further options need to be explored such as voting with a ‘bank’. This would change stake weight voting to open ticket voting, but validators get multiple votes at their disposal on a given vote tied to stake weight. A validator may feel very strongly on a choice and wish to vote as much as possible for that - each subsequent vote after the 1st vote becomes exponentially more expensive, thus limiting how much pull 1 individual has.
The other option would be to run all validator’s total stake though a quadratic function, the larger the total stake, the less voting power (or tokens) one validator wallet is able to represent proportionally.
Thank you for this post as this highlights the threats we face that seem to be overlooked.
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I believe that quadratic voting will allow Harmony’s HIP governance system to get back on track. I believe it to be the only option to offer a feasible solution to do so.
I haven’t seen a better idea proffered (or any others offered at all?). The conclusion I draw from that is that most agree that quadratic voting is the best path forward.
Reminder:
The last HIP to pass, voting for it began in January! By the time a new Voting HIP concludes and can be implemented, might we be looking at half-a-year of stalled governance?! That seems… unhealthy.
With that said, quadratic voting doesn’t specifically address the inconsistencies in the proposed treatment of Binance’s funds.
If Binance’s funds are to be deemed ineligible in regards to voting/quorum because they’re a “non-voting member”, then logically, that should apply to all of their funds.
Looking at an equation proposed by @TrickLuhDaKidz being VDAOG = ln(TotalONEStaked/10,000)+0.01. A somewhat similar take on what was presented above. This equation shows us that at 10,000 ONE a node will be given only 0.01 VDAOG tokens, and this would be the vote of said node. However, this presents some issues in ‘gaming’ the voting system by spinning up many smaller nodes which shall be illustrated.
Below I will go forward in a manner that assumes HIP-21 is in effect and we only consider nodes that vote.
Currently there are approximately 121 voting nodes. This data was taken from nodes that voted in HIP-16 and HIP-17. The total ONE staked on these ‘voting’ nodes is approximately 3,488,995,092 ONE. Applying the above equation to the voting nodes, we get 826.0985362 VDAOG that is distributed amongst them. 51 of those nodes would contain approximately half of the allotted VDAOG (418.8911398 VDAOG). Approximately 31 nodes would contain 1/3 of the total VDAOG tokens being 275.3134435 VDAOG.
The distribution of VDAOG vs Total ONE Stake may be seen here:
Applying the equation to a scenario such as having our largest voting nodes (those with > 20M ONE) all collude and vote together in hopes of blocking a vote. I chose 20M as an arbitrary number to gain a rough idea. We receive the following information:
It would be possible in overcoming the 34 nodes holding the 298 VDAOG.
Upon looking into the matter further if an operator started 20 nodes at 50,000 ONE each node would net approximately 1.6 VDAOG. For 1M ONE, 20 of those nodes may be created and a voting power of approximately 32 VDAOG may be controlled, >3x our current largest voting node. That is 10.7% the voting power of all voting nodes > 20M ONE stake combined. A possible solution to this problem may be raising the threshold for a node to be eligible in receiving VDAOG. At 300,000 ONE a node would receive approximately 3.411 VDAOG. Approximately 9 nodes would net 10% the voting power of all voting nodes > 20M ONE stake combined. This would cost about 2.7M ONE. By further extent, 100% of that voting power could be taken by 90 nodes equaling 27M ONE, is this enough of a deterrence to control voting power that the top ‘large’ nodes hold?
A link is found here for the excel document used to calculate this simulation. Ensure you are looking at the 1st sheet of the book. Feel free to play with the document as it offers a good rough idea from previous data. If some values do not display properly, try resizing the rows.
Please post your comments, thoughts and criticisms for this to be improved.
@ben2k_Stakeridoo @realcoinchowder @AffinityShard @CryptoTech
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Thanks @PiStake and @TrickLuhDaKidz for the effort made in designing a solution for our currrent “problem”. While I see that it really addresses our problems in every front, I see that it could create another problem of its own. No solution is perfect, what we are trying to achieve here is something that has the best of the both worlds, not neglecting either the “voices of the delegates” through the validators or the community represented by the smaller validators.
How to do this math? How to measure how many small validators a 300M validator could represent? It’s a hard task. I know that not everyone within the community won’t be necessarily doing the maths and putting effort on wonder how the system could be best balanced.
But considering that the goal for harmony is 1k validators or more, and assuming that the circulating supply won’t change, the median stake for 1k validators with a total stake of 60% of the total circulating supply, would be 7.2m median stake. That would mean that we would had 1k validators, each representing 7.2m votes. So in the end each validator would represent 1 vote. As the number of validator grow, the stake for each would be dimished in equal proportion to ADEQUATE all, if we want to achieve that scenario, we would need to start it while we can and where we can. The quadractic vote will level the things a bit, but we can’t forget that someone with malicious intent could try to gaming the system, as mentioned before and by trying to do so, its a must to make the things difficult for them.
Plot twist
In order to do so, I believe that we must keep the things inside the protocol, why not using the already defined EMS for that? In a perfect scenario, every validator would have the same stake and thus the same vote. And that would make it. Very difficult to someone to act maliciously. We are not there yet, so we could use the .65 EMS as point of start, and the max vote as the 1.35 EMS.
Elected validators without enough are considered to be at lower bounds and thus are given the minimum vote. Someone acting malicious could spin, 300 nodes. But witnout getting them elected, won’t have any result.
Them you could ask and about the validators that are not elected? They’re not part of the protocol? They could, but they aren’t yet. Since they’re not signing, they’re not providing security nor decentralization. They still can contribute with their ideas and having their voices heard at the discussions and the talks until the “EPOS” recognize them as a “contributing member” and give the approval stamp, deciding that it can validate, granting it the right to have his vote counted.
And the game between the elected would resume to having the minimum and the maximum, having 300m would be considered as having the 1.35 EMS and would net the same votes as someone that has this exact amount. This way we are going to starting to pave our way to the 1k validators dream.
The voting logic could be determined by the number of elected validators. The more it has the less the power of the higher EMS voters as described below.
As the protocol grows, and the validator count increase, it walks towards a truly decentralized governance being reflected at how the governance is conducted.
What you think? Maybe diverting the focus from the staking size and movingt on what we really want and matters, validator count. It´s natural that more validators join, the base of the pyramid grows larger. We just adjust it on the fly as the protocol grows and make sure it works as intended.
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Not sure if you seen the other calculate method?
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Hey Ben, what was the formula you derived exactly? From a glance I do like the distribution and addresses the issue I had brought up.
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The formular is based on stake weight % and kind of a quadratic system with a upper limit of voting power.
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Will do a review of the math looking at the tertiary consequences in the lower end of stake weight as security risk before I provide my final input on this, but we definitely need a voting system fix and this is inline with that.
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